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ON THE PRE-CONDITIONS OF BEGINNING A DISCOURSE ON MATTERS IN AFRICA  
 
CLEMENS ZOBEL 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY PARIS 8 
 
Abstract: What are the pre-conditions of making truth claims about phenomena in Africa? In 
this article I seek to outline a few basic presuppositions, which have enabled discourses on 
matters in Africa, making them coincide with something real by creating and reconfiguring 
their referents, while rendering others invisible. From a perspective influenced by my training 
in the history and anthropology of Africa in Paris, I particularly deal with the lasting impact of 
Enlightenment thought, cultural and functionalist anthropology and the ideas of French 
colonial officials. An examination of how the overdeterminations of the object “Africa” could 
be escaped involves an assessment of the ideas of Valentin Y. Mudimbe, Jean-Loup 
Amselle, Achille Mbembe and Johannes Fabian.  
Keywords: Idea of Africa, epistemology, ethnological reason, liberalism, colonialism.  
 
 
As part of a collective endeavour trying to come to terms with a diversity of social, cultural 
and political processes in Africa, this contribution seeks to deal with what exists before we 
start to discuss these realities.1 Michel Foucault’s reflexions as he began his inaugural 
lecture at the College de France in 1970 famously raised the issue of how beginning a 
discourse somehow always involves speaking within pre-existing institutional power 
relations.2 One could extend this argument by considering that discourses not only bear 
the weight of institutional spaces, but also suffer from a particular over-determination 
                                               
1
 I stress the difference between the homogenizing expression “African realities” and the idea that different 
realities exist in a geographical or political space called Africa. 
2
 In Foucault’s imaginary dialogue “[d]esire says: ‘I should not like to enter this risky order of discourse; I 
should not like to be involved in its peremptoriness and decisiveness; I should like it to be all around me like a 
calm, deep transparence, infinitely open, where others would fit in with my expectations, and from which truths 
would emerge one by one; I should only have to let myself be carried, within it and by it, like a happy wreck.’ 
The institution replies: ‘You should not be afraid of beginnings; we are all here in order to show you that 
discourse belongs to the order of laws, that we have long been looking after its appearances; that a place has 
been made ready for it, a place which honours it but disarms it; and that if discourse may sometimes have 
some power, nevertheless it is from us and us alone that it gets it’”. (Foucault, 1981: 51-52) 
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when certain objects are at stake. I would argue that, given the nature of their colonial and 
postcolonial relationships to the North, and their particular role in the emergence of 
modern thought, the past, present and future of societies in Africa represent such an over-
determined object of knowledge. It therefore seems particularly necessary to enquire into 
the pre-conditions of making truth claims about phenomena in Africa. In this respect we 
may ask: How did the idea of Africa as a starting point to question and represent reality 
emerge? Which fields of knowledge and which ideas were associated with it? How has 
this knowledge informed colonial and postcolonial political policies, as well as the work of 
scholars in and on societies in Africa?  
These questions are by no means new, considering that during the last half century 
thinking about the epistemic object “Africa” has given rise to a considerable body of work 
by sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, literary scholars and historians both in the 
West and in Africa. Rather than providing an overview of these efforts – a project that 
could well form the topic of a book yet to be published – I limit myself to selectively 
drawing from some of these endeavours in order to outline a few basic presuppositions, 
which have enabled discourses on matters in Africa, made them coincide with something 
real by creating and reconfiguring their referents, while rendering others invisible. These 
presuppositions are in themselves historical constructions, which, if we follow Jean 
Bazin’s vision of “a sociology of narrative production”, can be considered to be part of a 
succession of narratives that respond to a corresponding series of enunciative contexts 
(2008: 272). The following discussion presents an attempt to provide a brief outline of 
some of the most significant links in this chain. However, such a project faces two 
additional difficulties: on the one hand, the significance of each of the links changes 
according to its interpretative context; on the other hand, instead of being arranged in a 
pre-established linear fashion, their articulation in itself always remains problematic and 
subject to possible revision.3 The ideas I consider here as prime ingredients in the 
constitution of “Africa” as an object of knowledge reflect my own training at an African 
Studies department in France during the 1990s in which the analysis of Enlightenment 
thought, the history of academic anthropology and the analysis of the ideas of colonial 
officials featured prominently. This background also explains why in this article I deal with 
                                               
3
 A prominent example for a debate concerning the articulation, inclusion and exclusion of ideas involved in 
the making of “Africa” is the so-called “afrocentric” thesis defended by Cheikh Anta Diop (1954). The author 
delinks ancient Egypt from the Euro-Mediterranean civilization by arguing that it was fundamentally African 
and attempts to show how societies on the African continent were influenced by it. Similarly, the work of Martin 
Bernal (1988) deals with African-Egyptian influences on Greek society. While such moves are certainly 
provocative, in as far as they contest the dominant European historical narrative underpinning its claim to 
superiority; they also can be understood as re-appropriations of earlier European scientific ideas. In this 
respect the British diffusionist anthropologist Grafton Elliot Smith (1871-1937) claimed that the Egyptian 
civilization had had a profound influence on the world. Moreover, both Bernal and Diop reproduce an 
essentialist model by stressing one set of civilisational exchanges to the detriment of another.  
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arguments by two academic authors from Africa, who have attracted particular interest on 
the Parisian scene: the Congolese Valentin Y. Mudimbe and the Cameroonese Achille 
Mbembe, while leaving aside the contributions of other prominent researchers in the 
history of ideas on Africa, such as Kwame Anthony Appiah, Paulin Hountounji, Paul 
Tiyambe Zeleza or Elisio Macamo. 
I start with the emergence of Africa in antiquity, its rediscovery in the 15th century and 
the emergence of an evolutionist discourse in the Enlightenment based on the methods of 
comparative naturalism. I then deal with the question of how liberal thought and the 
abolitionist movement led to the justification of 19th century colonialism and provided a 
stimulus for scientific innovation. A discussion of the inversion of the scientific devaluation 
of Africa through functionalist and cultural anthropology allows me to consider the lasting 
impact of the paradigm of comparative naturalism and to think about the conditions for 
decolonising knowledge on matters in Africa.  
 
1. THE EMERGENCE OF A PLACE, A NAME AND AN OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE 
My starting point is the concluding part of the first chapter of Valentin Mudimbe’s book The 
Idea of Africa (1994) dealing with the “naming and metaphorizing” of the continent and its 
inhabitants. Having previously discussed how in antiquity Africa had been subject to 
Greek, Roman, Phoenician and Achaemenid descriptions during the first millennium 
before Christ (in the 6th century A.D. the Phoenician Necos circumnavigated the 
continent), in this section Mudimbe discusses where the name “Africa” came from and 
how its significance for Western thought evolved until it became one of the privileged 
objects of a science named anthropology or ethnology.  
For the Romans Africa designates one of their provinces, while its inhabitants are 
called Afri or Africani. In technical and literary works Africa may also refer to a third part of 
the world corresponding to the classical Greek idea of Lybia. Aethiops, the generic name 
for dark-skinned people derives from the name of Vulkan’s son in Greek mythology. The 
polysemic designation Aethiopia qualifies the continent as a place near the sun which 
burns people’s skin. Aethiopia is variously confounded or distinguished from Lybia and, as 
Mudimbe puts it, “by the first century A.D. the continent as a whole has been divided into 
three main parts by geographers: Egypt, Lybia, and Aethiopia, the last corresponding 
more or less to sub-Saharan Africa” (1994: 27). In the context of the European 
explorations in the 15th century the designation Aethiopia was replaced by the name 
Nigritia, derived from the Latin word niger, which again relates to the skin of people 
burned by the sun. As Mudimbe notes, at this moment, the word is still neutral in its value. 
Descriptions by explorers and navigators were done “in the name of difference” and “not 
necessarily because of an intellectual politics of prejudice” (ibidem: 29). What is striking in 
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16th and 17th century representations is their tendency to “Westernize” others’ bodies, 
while reiterating a principle according to which the differences and particularity of beings 
and things should be preserved. However, in the last instance such a principle remained 
firmly rooted in a hierarchising ideology, given that the place of the other within what was 
to become an international legal order had already been defined since the 15th century 
through a series of papal declarations or bulls. Based on the concept of “terra nullius” 
stipulating a European right to sovereignty outside of Europe, and as a corollary, the 
absence of sovereignty for non-Western polities, the papal philosophy ultimately 
legitimated the right to colonize and to enslave people. Here we also find the foundation of 
an argument that informed the idea of a necessary development or mise en valeur of the 
colonies based on the idea that Western man had the duty to make sure that “all goods 
made by God for the whole of mankind should be exploited” (ibidem: 37).  
In order to understand the coexistence of a Christian ideology of European expansion 
with a will to come to terms with difference, we need to grasp the theoretical debates 
surrounding newly discovered “savages”. Such encounters raised the problem of 
understanding how one could account for the truth of the book of Genesis if humanity did 
not descend from one people. This question was resolved by hierarchising humans within 
a natural chain of being in which geographical location accounts for difference. Such a 
philosophical anthropology, which Mudimbe qualifies as “static”, in as far as no historical 
dynamic of change linking the savage to Western man was observed, can be contrasted 
with a new paradigm emerging in the 18th century. In it “a strong connection between the 
African continent and the concept of primitiveness, and thus of savagery” (ibidem: 28) is 
made.  
New ideas first introduced by the German philosopher and mathematician Gottfried 
Leibnitz and Charles Darwin’s grandfather, the doctor and botanist Erasmus Darwin 
suggested that different classes of being, including men and animals, are not only 
connected, but are also part of a temporal order, in which, according to Darwin, not only 
all beings undergo transformations, but acquire characteristics which are transmitted to 
their posterity. While God could still be considered the fabricator of every one of these 
kinds of being, enlightenment thought gradually introduced a new perspective inspired by 
René Descartes in which God is the source of natural law and the “world was not 
‘produced at once in a finished and perfect state,’ but came gradually into existence” 
(Hodgen apud Mudimbe,1994: 29). Grounded in the principle of regularity and legality 
“working uniformly in all times and places” (ibidem) this line of thought ultimately provided 
the epistemic basis for 19th century evolutionist anthropology in which a scale of 
civilizations places human merits, cultural values and technical progress in an orderly 
succession from “primitive” societies to modern man. Mudimbe’s demonstration on how 
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the names of Africa came to become metaphors of inferiority, first through static and then 
evolutionist anthropology, places them into a sequential order. However, one may also 
consider that the earlier perspective, which engaged with difference through a form of 
cultural relativism reappeared, both in the 19th and 20th century theories of German 
cultural anthropology, which sought to retrace (pre-)historical processes of cultural 
diffusion, and, albeit less obviously, within the colonial project of transforming Africa 
through a civilising mission.4  
Reading Mudimbe’s reflexions in the Idea of Africa and complementing them with his 
arguments in his earlier and most well-known book The Invention of Africa (1988), one 
understands that the confounding of geographical categories with skin colour, the Papal 
legitimisation of European expansion along with the way comparative naturalism placed 
all human phenomena into the common framework of a movement from the primitive to 
the civilized, while Enlightenment philosophers “defined the characteristics of savagery” 
(ibidem: 72), basically set the stage for the reduction of diversity to a unified analytical 
object and its depreciation through colonialism and the emerging modern sciences. This 
however leaves us with the question of how all of this distinguished people in Africa from 
other parts of the non-Western world, and why Africa was to become the centre of a 
second wave of European expansion and colonization in the 19th and early 20th century.  
 
2. THE “LIBERATION” OF AFRICA AND THE SCIENTIFIC CRITIQUE OF ENLIGHTENMENT 
POLITICAL THEORY 
In this section I argue that Africa as an emerging object of scientific knowledge and 
colonial policy cannot be conceived without taking into account its relationship to liberal 
thought, the movement for the abolition of slavery and the sociological and 
anthropological critique of Enlightenment political philosophy. François Manchuelle’s 
seminal studies on “The ‘Régéneration of Africa’” (1996) and “Origines Républicaines de 
la politique d’expansion colonial de Jules Ferry” (1988) are useful guides to the 
relationship between liberalism, abolitionism and colonisation with a clear significance 
beyond the French context. Manchuelle’s basic argument goes as follows: 18th century 
anti-absolutist Enlightenment thinkers reinterpreted the antique theory of the existence of 
a “natural law”, which was applicable to all societies. They sought to demonstrate that 
“individual self-interest, the motivation of all human actions, was not only compatible with 
collective interest but was its foundation – and thus the foundation of natural law” 
(Manchuelle, 1996: 560). The concept of ‘natural’ was also invested by an analogical 
                                               
4
 Similarly, one could argue that while evolutionism breaks with the earlier static vision of creation, it also 
remains indebted to a Christian idea of time. As Anthony Giddens (1994) has pointed out, the modern idea of 
progress clearly is related to the idea of eschatology according to which time necessarily flows towards a final 
moment of salvation. 
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sense borrowed from the life sciences according to which in its normal state of health a 
(social) body needed no direction. Absolutism and its economic corollary mercantilism 
could therefore be considered as an artificial, unnatural state of society and were 
associated with Oriental despotism, the designation used to qualify the domination 
exerted at that time by the Ottoman Empire. Given its economic and political implications, 
such a theory on the negative effects of despotic rule was also used to engage in a 
critique of the slave trade. According to ideas shared by both Republicans and Christians, 
the influence of slave trading on African polities had led to a degeneration of their 
societies and it was a duty of civilised men to support their liberation which would 
eventually lead to a new order based on free labour. In the case of the Republicans, such 
scenarios drew from a Rousseauist perspective according to which the natural state of 
man could be improved by civilization, just as much as the ills of the latter could be 
corrected by the former. As Manchuelle shows, this line of thought not only provided a 
rationale for the abolition of slavery, but justified the project of colonising or ‘pacifying’ 
African societies by liberating them from despotic regimes.5 Moreover, the appropriation of 
Enlightenment liberal ideas also inspired African nationalist thought, either through the 
idea of creating free States of returned ex-slaves (Sierra Leone and Liberia), or by 
imagining a post-colonial polity based on a synthesis between what was best in Western 
civilisation and positive cultural features of traditional Africa, such as the oral tradition and 
the solidarity of the extended family.6 
During this gradual emergence of a certain idea of what African societies were 
(supposed to be) like, its liberalist underpinnings had in themselves been transformed, 
which again had important consequences for the way historical processes were 
understood. In this respect, the foundation of modern sociology and anthropology had a 
crucial role to play. As Marc Abélès discusses in his book Anthropologie de l’État (1990) 
the sociological project was motivated by a critique of what was conceived as an 
individualist illusion. It was created by a political philosophy according to which society 
and sovereignty were the result of a social contract among free individuals. Whereas the 
oldest human societies were characterized by individuals living in a state of nature, legal 
scholars, sociologists and later anthropologists wanted to demonstrate that, to the 
                                               
5 Of course Manchuelle is by no means implying that the colonialist project was not also fuelled by nationalist 
dynamics and economical interests in a time of heightened competition in the so-called “imperialist” period 
culminating between the final decades of the 19th century and the beginning of World War I. Here colonialism 
was the answer to the effects of industrialization, namely the need to open up new markets, find new sources 
of raw materials and reunite societies divided by class interests, but also a means to secure geopolitical 
advantages.  
6
 The idea of a superior synthesis between modernity and tradition is also a characteristic trait of the different 
variants of African socialism which emerged in the mid-20th century, defended by leaders such as Kwame 
Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere or Sekou Badian Kouyaté (Benot, 1969). Here Enlightenment liberal ideas 
concerning “natural law” could be replaced by Engels’ idea of “Ur-kommunismus” (primordial communism) and 
dialectics. 
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contrary, the individual of the philosophers was not the beginning but the outcome of a 
long evolutionary process.  
Initially based on an interpretation of biblical, Greek and Roman sources, these 
arguments became increasingly founded on ethnographic descriptions such as those of 
so called tribal societies in North Africa and North America. Two basic points of view 
emerged. The first one, which can be associated with the Scottish legal scholar Henry 
Maine, stipulated that the origins of social and political organization were to be found in 
paternal authority and kinship relations. These gradually developed into territorial 
relationships, which were precursors of the modern, social contract based political regime. 
A second perspective was developed by the American anthropologist Louis Henry 
Morgan. According to Morgan, the family was a later development after an original stage 
of promiscuity and the beginnings of the modern polity and of politics itself lay in the 
confederations of tribes such as the Iroquois Indians. Common to both cases is the 
establishment of a more or less pronounced divide between the modern contractual order 
based on individual’s will to engage with each other and its pre-modern counterpart where 
social relations are fundamentally structured by kinship. This divide not only justified a 
difference between the respective objects of the anthropologist/ethnologist and the 
sociologist – the former dealing with kinship based societies, the latter with contract-based 
one’s –, but also informed the way colonial powers conceived their subjects as distinct 
from metropolitan citizens. To the contrary of what a liberal theory of abolitionism might 
suggest, the prime object of such knowledge is not the free individual but the status 
holding member of the kinship, tribal or ethnic group. In his seminal book Citizens and 
Subjects (1996), Mahmood Mamdani usefully summed up the underlying apartheid logic 
of the various colonial legal orders in Africa through the concept of the “bifurcate state”. In 
every colony a small, often urban minority of settlers or assimilés enjoying full civic and 
political rights was set apart from a mostly rural majority which was held to live under the 
rule of customary law as represented by religious or tribal authorities.7 
As Mamdani’s reference to apartheid suggests, race was a crucial element in this 
politico-legal configuration. Informed by 19th century biology and human anthropology, 
which reformulated and systematized older ideas of difference, race must be seen as the 
key element which provided a fundamental coherence both to colonial policy and, as we 
will discuss briefly further below, to its pan-africanist adversaries. To grasp how this 
                                               
7
 One must however consider that, as he himself has acknowledged, Mamdani’s model may be more useful to 
understand the ideological political-legal blueprints of the late 19th and early 20th century colonial orders, than 
the actual historical realities on the ground. In this respect economic and political interests led to a situation in 
which the central state did not always clearly support the power of local traditional authorities and in which 
customary norms would mix with capitalist market-values, while in rural areas the accumulation strategies of a 
diversity of local actors along with people’s widespread mobility led to “a limited capacity of the state to order 
the countryside” (Freund, 2000: 104). 
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played itself out in colonial policy, we can draw from two books by Jean-Loup Amselle on 
the politics of identity in the French colonial Empire. In the fourth chapter8 of Vers un 
multiculturalisme français. L’empire de la coutume (1996) the author analyses the thought 
of Louis Faidherbe, who was the governor general of Senegal, the oldest French colony in 
Africa, in the mid-nineteenth century. In line with the Republican idea of regeneration 
mentioned earlier on, Faidherbe developed a theory of colonial policy according to which 
negro-Africans had a distinct culture which had been deteriorated by the military 
domination of nomadic groups, such as the Fulbe or Peul. Associated with slavery and 
trade these groups were promoters of Arab-Muslim civilization and a radical form of Islam, 
which was distinguished by the French colonial doctrine from the peaceful “black” Islam 
that had been present in Sub-Saharan Africa for hundreds of years. The aim of colonial 
expansion and rule was to abolish the domination of “foreigners” in order to allow 
autochthonous negro-African people to freely develop a society based on agriculture 
under French protection. Significantly, Faidherbe’s racial theory sits uneasily between a 
rejection of metissage, seeking to identify the purest, oldest and therefore most authentic 
African ethnic groups, and his belief in its positive virtues as source of progress. This 
ambiguity is also present in his ideas on different races: while clearly being fascinated with 
negro-Africans he also recognizes their inferiority and draws from ideas in physical 
anthropology about differences in brain-size, to justify it. As Amselle points out, Faidherbe 
shaped his model out of his previous experience in Algeria, the first and only large scale 
French settler colony. Here the Bureaux Arabes – an institution created for the study of 
tribal societies and the development of appropriate policies – elaborated similar 
distinctions between Arab conquerors and Berber autochthonous people. He also shares 
with this institution a keen interest for languages and local cultures, which makes 
Faidherbe an early example of colonial administrator-ethnographers who contributed to 
the rise of cultural relativism.  
The ethnographic curiosity of Faidherbe and other colonial administrators points at a 
characteristic ambiguity in late 19th century thought on Africa, where evolutionist or 
primitivist interpretations coexist with a desire to come to terms with local cultures. As we 
saw earlier on, representations of Africa became increasingly discriminatory and Euro-
centric with the rise of the evolutionist paradigm and its racist scientific and 
anthropological expressions. In the Invention of Africa Mudimbe posits that a paradigmatic 
break with this negative perspective came after World War I in the 1920s (1988: 83), even 
though earlier exceptions are acknowledged. In the account I have outlined here, such a 
clear-cut distinction between devaluing and valuing perspectives does not exist. The 
                                               
8
 The chapter is entitled “Faidherbe: Un raciologue républicain”. 
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ambiguity starts with liberal Enlightenment thought itself, which values what it conceives 
as the “natural” state of humanity, while recognizing a necessary development from the 
“savage” to the “civilized”. It can be relocated in the perspective of colonial administrator 
ethnographers, who genuinely sought to understand local cultures by learning the 
language and studying people’s oral history, while maintaining evolutionist ideas. 
Faidherbe’s case is important in as far as it exerted a lasting influence on a policy of 
the colonial administration designated as politique de races in which one sought to 
eliminate the domination of Muslim states through colonial conquest and to establish an 
administrative order based on small cantons, each made up of a few villages and a 
customary chief. It also has broader significance in as far as it illustrates a racial 
paradigm, which was common to other colonial powers9. Its underlying argument was that 
the State was not a characteristic feature of genuine negro-African societies, thus 
reproducing the fundamental anthropological distinction between kinship based and 
contractual societies. Wherever States could be found they were held to be the result of 
migrations and conquests made by foreigners who were usually identified with 
representatives of a hamito-semitic or “red” race. This race was held to be particularly 
gifted for warfare and endowed with advanced mental faculties, but also identified as 
religious fanatics and traitors. Both British and Belgian colonial authorities made use of 
this distinction when designating potential intermediaries for the maintenance of colonial 
rule.10 The same was the case for Christian missionaries, who particularly focused on 
racially defined elites in their efforts to convert people.11 
 
3. ETHNOGRAPHIC REASON AND THE HERITAGE OF COMPARATIVE NATURALISM 
In order to understand the epistemological complex that left a lasting influence on thought 
on matters in Africa, it is important to bring such racial classifications in relation with what 
Amselle calls “ethnographical reason” (1998: 5). Inspired by the sociology of Emile 
Durkheim, the functionalist, fieldwork based ethnography, which started to emerge at the 
very end of the 19th century, was opposed both to evolutionist speculation and to theories 
of race. However, it can be argued that both evolutionist racial models of classification and 
ethnological categorizations along lines of ethnic, kinship and religious difference were 
                                               
9
 The widespread presence of this explanatory framework may also relate to its long presence in the history of 
ideas. As Michel Foucault (1997) argues, the idea of a “war of races” between a more and lesser developed 
people (in the case of France, the Francs and the Gaulois) can be traced back to 17th and 18th century 
theories on the creation of the state,  
10 Examples are the administration of British Sudan by an “Arab” administrative elite to the detriment of “negro-
African” southerners, and in Rwanda the use of Tutsi as intermediaries between the colonial administration 
and Hutu.  
11
 Again the Rwandan case provides an exemplary case in as far as race and ethnicity were crucial elements 
“that affected missionary understandings of exactly who should be considered elite and, thus, who should be 
targeted for conversion” (Longman, 2001: 168). 
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inspired by the same underlying epistemology of 18th century comparative naturalism. In 
its most general sense such a method can be associated with Pierre Bourdieu’s 
“scholastic logic” (1972), or with Jack Goody’s “logic of writing” (1986). In each case, 
science proceeds by recording, organising and classifying phenomena in tables and 
thereby producing a basis for the advancement of knowledge through the comparison of 
distinct units. In ethnology such units of comparison are identified with ethnic groups or 
tribes. As Amselle notes, “in ancient Greece, the ethnos was conceived as an order 
opposed to the polis in as far as it lacked integration, self-sufficiency, and the division of 
labour” (1998: 6-7). We have already seen that such a dichotomy resurfaced in 19th 
century evolutionist theories of the development of societies from kinship based to 
territorial based organizations. The theoretical and practical consequences of such a 
division are crucial. In Amselle’s terms the outcome of descriptions of societies in Africa 
and the development of colonial policies is a perspective in which “the spatial and the 
political are superseded by the temporal and the ethnic” (ibidem: 9).  
A good entry point to understanding what this means is Johannes Fabian’s critique of 
cultural relativism in his book Time and the Other (1983). Fabian argues that the relativist 
idea that cultures are different because they are separated by geographical distance 
actually implicitly translates into an argument about time. From the Eurocentric 
perspective of cultural comparison, the spatial distance of non-European cultures 
translates into a distance in time. One already finds this homology between distance in 
space and time in 18th century evolutionary models, such as the one drawn up by Joseph-
François Lafitau in his Mœurs des sauvages américains comparées aux mœurs des 
premiers temps (1724). Here, as Amselle puts it, the author “proposes a vision in which 
modern primitives would be our contemporary ancestors” (1998: 9). In Fabian’s terms, the 
consequence of this is that the non-Western other is not considered to be a contemporary 
of modern man. There is “a removal from a dialogic situation” and such a lack of “co-
evalness” means they cannot communicate on equal terms (1983: 85-86). 
Presenting knowledge about Africa as the knowledge of a series of distinct ethnic 
groups, which each have their particular features and modes of organization, means not 
only starting out by supposing that their internal organization is governed by kinship rather 
than territorial relationships, but, most importantly, ignoring how these units historically 
came into existence through their interaction in spatial terms. Placing people “out of time” 
(Thomas, 1989) means engaging in a pseudo-historical or substantialist perspective 
according to which understanding the truth about the organization of a group lies in 
identifying its origins, its purest and most authentic manifestations, or its “zero-degree” in 
Amselle’s terms. Marcel Griaule’s fieldwork on the West African Dogon, which was 
marked by a characteristic obsession for the authentic and a corresponding disinterest for 
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hybrid forms or acculturation, is symptomatic in this respect. It reflects a characteristic 
ethnological predicament of the first half of the 20th century in which research could only 
be conceived as either seeking to “salvage” what was left of non-Western cultures or of 
engaging in work on so called “culture change”, which involved understanding how these 
societies were the more or less passive victims of destruction. 
As already suggested, in terms of colonial policy this perspective translated into a 
method of government that considered colonial subjects in ethnic terms and as separate 
from a metropolitan and hence contemporary understanding of citizenship. As the 
characteristics of ethnic groups were understood either in terms of innate cultural features 
or as resulting from the influence of conquerors, no change from within was imaginable. 
Moreover, the colonial administration stressed the kinship based character of social 
relations, while reading it through the distinct authoritarian lens of a hierarchical structure 
of “commandment” (Mbembe, 2001). In this respect one also may perceive the limits of 
constructing continuity between science and policy. As Adam Kuper has shown in his 
discussion of the relationship between British anthropology and colonialism (1993) 
anthropologists were most of all interested in understanding the internal complexity of the 
groups they were studying and relating these to academic debates. While the ambition to 
codify customary law and thus provide a useful contribution to a functioning colonial 
administration did exist, surprisingly the authorities made relatively little use of this work. 
Seeking efficiency and quick results which were not necessarily to be gained by engaging 
in the intricacies of local practices, officials also distrusted ethnographers because of their 
closeness to their informants and their sympathy for them. It therefore might be useful to 
construct the relationship between knowledge and colonial policy in a more indirect 
fashion through the idea of a common epistemology that constructed ethnic societies by 
obliterating their spatial interaction – each group representing an integrated whole – and 
failing to recognize their historical nature. Here a final point has to be made about the 
weight of comparative naturalism. The latter had a decisive influence on functionalist 
sociology, whose prime interest was to understand how social cohesion comes about and 
how societies represent integrated wholes. Social structure could be compared to the 
morphology of organisms and the question of reproduction or socialization blotted out the 
question of internal conflicts and contradictions, which could lead to the need for decision 
making and historical change.  
 
4. THE DECOLONIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE  
I choose to highlight a perspective in which coming to terms with people in Africa basically 
meant coming to terms with their history and their political agency. Seen from the distance 
of more than half a century, a paradigmatic change in terms of what knowledge on 
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matters in Africa meant is inseparable from the process of decolonisation and the rise of a 
new political awareness among the colonised. The increasing criticism towards 
colonialism after the end of World War II, which was based on new standards to self-
determination outlined in the Atlantic charter of 1941, also brought about a turn in colonial 
policy. In order to justify their continuing presence in Africa colonial administrations 
increasingly invested in infrastructure and public welfare and this also involved creating 
institutions involved in the production of applied knowledge, such as the Office de la 
Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer (ORSTOM) with respect to the French 
colonies, founded in 1944, and the Rhodes Livingstone Institute in Lusaka, in the British 
case, which was established in 1938. The influence of communist parties in the metropolis 
and the colonies found its echo in the belated adoption of Marxist thought by sociology 
and anthropology.12 The Manchester School of Max Gluckman, which developed its 
research program at the Rhodes Livingstone Institute, marked a gradual rupture with the 
functionalist paradigm in as far as it was interested in conflict as an integral part of social 
processes rather than as an anomaly. While the return to cohesion rather than historical 
change was still the main focus of Gluckman’s work, studies conducted by himself and his 
students at the Rhodes Livingstone Institute also marked a more decisive break with 
ethnographic reason by abandoning the format of the monograph on the ethnic group. A 
new way of proceeding emerged, which has become known as the extended case study 
method. It dealt with understanding the encounter of different interest groups (i.e. 
members of the colonial administration, ethnologists, unionised workers, farmers, 
customary chiefs) in a specific historical situation, such as the inauguration of a bridge, or 
the struggles of workers to improve conditions in Rhodesian copper mines. Considering 
what was said earlier on about the features of ethnological reason, the rupture here was 
twofold, playing itself out both in terms of breaking up reified spatial units and introducing 
contemporary time shared by colonisers and colonised.  
This perspective was also taken up in French anthropology through the work of the 
sociologist Georges Balandier and his concept “situation coloniale” (1951). As Balandier 
put it, this idea sought to avoid both searching for the ethnographically pure and to 
engage in technical applied research by addressing problems raised by the relationships 
between dominated people, who can speak through an “I” and the colonial administration 
(ibidem: 5-6). After decolonization in the early 1960s, in France this approach gave rise to 
a so called “dynamic anthropology” which sought to engage in a historically embedded 
analysis of social processes, often with a particular interest for comparisons in terms of 
                                               
12
 We must consider that while the birth of sociology in the 19th century is closely related to the need of 
understanding the conflicts and contradictions arising from capitalism and finding remedies, its fundamental 
orientation was reformist or social-democratic rather than revolutionary.  
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Marxist categories such as modes of production or the distinction between capitalist and 
non-capitalist societies. However, as Amselle remarks, comparison in these terms 
continues to reify distinct social formations (i.e. hunter-gatherers vs. agricultural vs. 
capitalist societies) rather than analyzing the historical relations of these formations to 
each other (1993: 16). To mark a final break with the naturalist paradigm, what was seen 
to be distinct societies characterised as “state-building”, “stateless” or “segmentary”, 
should rather be analysed as interrelated parts of a shared continental or even 
intercontinental space (an “economy world” to use Immanuel Wallerstein’s term). 
Emerging in the 1970s, this perspective anticipated globalization theory, while reacting to 
Braudel’s, Wallerstein’s and Samir Amin’s work, by relating political and economic 
processes within networks of societies in Africa to “external” factors. In epistemological 
terms its final outcome was what Amselle calls “primordial syncretism” (ibidem: 29), 
referring to the axiomatic postulate that all societies are internally marked by a plurality of 
belonging and that their very existence is due to their interrelationship with contiguous 
social units.  
This postulate also made the author become particularly interested in processes of 
“feedback”, pertaining to the appropriation of Western knowledge by the societies, which 
were its object of representation. In concrete terms, this means understanding how 
ethnological reason was appropriated in the self-representations of people and by their 
political ideologies, but also examining how it has continued to structure Western 
representations of Africa in the postcolonial period. 
As the work of French administrator-ethnographers and of functionalist anthropology 
illustrates, overcoming ethnographical reason does not simply mean inverting the 
devaluation of culture and society in Africa.13 To the contrary, if we consider Achille 
Mbembe’s discussion of “African writings of the Self” (2000), its characteristic effects of 
closure have continued to haunt precisely those representations which sought to liberate 
knowledge on Africa from its Western-centred bias. According to Mbembe three 
arguments mark these efforts: (1) “refuting Western definitions of Africa and Africans by 
revealing their falseness and bad faith”; (2) “denouncing what the West has made Africa 
endure (and continues to make it endure) in the name of such definitions”; (3) providing 
proof which seeks “to disqualify the African fictions of the West, to refute their pretention 
to monopolise the expression of the human in general and to open a space where the 
African could finally narrate to herself her own fables (autodefinition) in a voice that cannot 
                                               
13 One could here draw a parallel with Partha Chatterjee’s analysis of anti-colonial Indian nationalism. While 
proposing a paradigmatic shift in as far as the latter advocated a valorisation of Indian culture and history, 
which had been denied by the colonisers, Chatterjee argues that Indian nationalism remained grounded in the 
same ideology as its Western counterpart. 
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be imitated because it is authentically hers” (ibidem: 17).14 Mbembe argues that such 
endeavours are poised against “a kind of prison in which, even today, [African doxa] is 
struggling”. The prison is made up of what is considered to be a historically singular 
condition of having been separated from one’s self, expropriated, subjected and 
intellectually, as well as ontologically estranged through the heritage of slavery, 
colonization and apartheid and their masks race, geography and tradition.   
Mudimbe’s book The Invention of Africa seeks to confront this problem by suggesting 
that the decolonization of knowledge implies engaging with what he calls the “colonial 
library”, rather than pursuing the illusion that one could escape from it by creating a form 
of counter-knowledge. In this respect, his work is an appraisal of the ways through which 
three major intellectual traditions (African writing in literature and in politics through the 
Negritude, black personality, and Pan-africanist movements; the emergence an 
“ethnophilosophy” inspired by the work of missionary-ethnographers; and an engagement 
with African history marked by new methodologies such as Jan Vansina’s work on oral 
tradition and a critical reading of European models of African history) have sought to 
break with 19th century “primitivist strategies” (1988: 194). But, similar to the reflections of 
Amselle and Mbembe, it is also an enquiry into the extent to which these currents of 
thought have remained dependent on the presuppositions of the paradigm they set out to 
confront. Can we therefore say that in their sensibility for the epistemological problems 
involved in decolonizing knowledge, these authors offer a common framework for 
engaging with matters in Africa? Before addressing this final question, let us retrace the 
steps that brought us here. 
 
CONCLUSION: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE WORLD IN AFRICA/AFRICA IN THE WORLD 
As discussed in the introduction, understanding Africa as an object of knowledge has 
involved exploring the interrelationship between a series of ideas and historical contexts. I 
started out by presenting Mudimbe’s discussion of the emergence of “Africa” as an idea 
and a metaphor leading back to early encounters during antiquity. We then saw how the 
second discovery of the continent in the 15th century drew from its descriptions in 
antiquity, while rendering the ascribed differences of its people compatible with the 
Christian idea of Genesis. As a result, in a static anthropology savages were placed within 
a natural order created by god in which representations of African others emphasized 
difference without necessarily associating it with negative values. Meanwhile, the 
emerging political-legal international order was clearly discriminatory in as far as people 
from Africa were denied the right to sovereignty.  
                                               
14
 My translation. 
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Enlightenment thought introduced a new spatial-temporal framework which conceived 
human diversity as part of a secular movement of progress from the primitive to the 
civilized with Africans representing the earliest and most backward manifestations of the 
human species. In the 19th century modern science clearly evolved out of 17th and 18th 
century comparative naturalism and further specified the physical and mental inferiority of 
Africans within racial classifications. However, I argued that the place of Africa in modern 
science and colonial policy cannot be understood without considering a liberal political 
perspective which held that primitive Africans were the expression of a natural state of 
Man whose freedom had been curtailed by the slave trade and the rise of despotic states. 
Here colonialism represented the necessary corollary to the abolition of slavery, while its 
legal policies applied a socio-anthropological distinction between kinship status-based, 
apolitical societies, on the one hand, and political, contract-based ones, on the other 
hand. We have seen how the essentialist, apolitical and ahistorical tenets of comparative 
naturalism, referred to by Amselle as ethnological reason, have had a lasting effect by 
conditioning subsequent efforts to valorize culture and society in Africa. It is important 
here to emphasize that such representations have to a large extent continued to structure 
both Western and African ideas on culture, politics and development15. More generally, 
considering the changes in ideas on Africa leads me to stress continuing ambiguities 
between relativist/culturalist and universalist/evolutionist perspectives, rather than a 
sequence in which older paradigms are replaced by newer ones.16  
Finally, breaking with the manifold expressions of ethnological reason involves 
reconsidering the positioning of the continent in time and space. Rather than describing 
social or geopolitical dynamics in terms of an interaction of self-contained compartments 
we consider how social processes are conditioned by spatial interactions on a local, 
regional, national, continental and global scale. Here spatial interrelatedness necessarily 
involves looking at historical interconnections and considering people in Africa as 
contemporaneous. As Fabian’s concept of co-evalness suggests, such a double move in 
time and space creates the possibility for politics in the sense that people in Africa are 
involved in setting agendas, discussing them and participating in the making of decisions. 
While such a task of epistemic renewal and decolonization may be a long way from being 
                                               
15 While such phenomena cannot be discussed here, one could cite four recent examples: the elaboration of a 
scientific discourse on the existence of an African poetics, which associates literature from the continent with 
an underlying structure relying on orality (Basto, 2006); the emergence of a discourse on “African 
Renaissance” in the 1990’s associating contemporary political and cultural innovation with the resurgence of a 
great civilisation (this discourse echoes the independence ideologies of African socialism); the speech of the 
French President Nicholas Sarkozy at Dakar’s Cheikh Anta Diop University in which the speaker considered 
that Africans had yet to enter into history; and finally the instrumentalisation and manipulation of ethnic 
identities by governments in countries such as Kenya, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Ethiopia and Mauritania.  
16 I follow here Michel de Certeau’s critique of the tendency of historiography to reduce the complex historicity 
of social life to a succession of periods. 
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fully achieved, the consequences of placing Africa in the world also remain under 
discussion.  
Amselle and Mbembe have both stressed the cosmopolitan integration of people in 
Africa, and in the case of Amselle, the extent to which Western and Arab-Muslim thought 
have defined the very terms through which people in Africa think of themselves. To the 
contrary, Mudimbe asks whether our discussion on the ways how Africans have been 
conceived through scientific discourses does “not obscure a fundamental reality, their own 
chose du texte, the primordial African discourse in its variety and multiplicity” (1988: 186). 
This question contains both a warning and an encouragement, which points at the extent 
to which thinking about the way we come to terms with the world in Africa/Africa in the 
world is still a work in progress. First of all it points at the necessity not to overestimate the 
impact of hegemonic projects and ways of thinking on society, suggesting that people in 
Africa have dealt with colonialism and all other subsequent states and development 
policies on their own historical terms. Secondly, it reminds us of the sheer intellectual and 
epistemological challenge for us “to relate in a more faithful way to la chose du texte”, (…) 
“beyond the anthropological and philosophical categories used by specialists of dominant 
discourses” (ibidem). In this final respect, rather than thinking in terms of ways to leave 
behind the dominant categories of academic disciplines, the project of co-eval 
engagement provides us with the task of imagining spaces and forms of knowledge 
production where these concepts may engage with other ways of conceiving the world. 
Here we could cite Fabian’s own ethnographic experiments with a Congolese theatre 
group, in which ethnography consists of writing about the unfolding of an investigative 
process within a theatre production seeking to respond to the anthropologist’s questions 
about the meaning of the popular proverb “le pouvoir se mange entier” (1990). One could 
also evoke the ambitious concept/project of an “epistemology of the south”, which was 
first outlined by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1995) and has recently been systematized 
in an issue of the Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais (Meneses, 2008). At stake here is 
the finding of ways to deal with epistemological diversity by confronting heterodox forms of 
knowledge from the south and the north with the academic disciplines that had previously 
been responsible for rendering them invisible. 
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